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ABSTRACT 
Given the rising interest in the relationship between Environmental, Social and Governance 
rating (ESG) and its components, this paper investigates the relationship between 
insider/institutional ownership structure, ESG ratings and financial performance of the firm, using 
398 companies in U.S. 2017 obtained from Bloomberg. This paper entails cross-sectional analysis 
of ESG rating and its components in 10 sectors (Communication, Consumer Discretionary, 
Consumer Staples, Energy, Financial, Health Care, Industrials, Materials, Technology, and 
Utilities) and Return on Asset as a matrix for financial performance. The results suggest that ESG 
rating and performance of the firm is positively and significantly associated, except environmental 
score. Ownership structure differently affects to ESG rating and its component by the sectors, even 
when controlling for the firm’s size. The study contributes to research on both the impact of ESG 
rating and its components to the performance of the firm and the relationship between ownership 
structure and ESG performance. 
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ESG Rating and Ownership Structure 
 
Introduction 
1. About the ESG  
Traditionally, investors in modern capitalist economies have based their buy or sell 
decisions on the financial profitability of a firm.  As owners of the firm, shareholders have 
mandated their agents the managers, to base their decisions on shareholder wealth 
maximization.  In certain parts of the world, the mandate for managers was stakeholder 
wealth maximization.  However, agency conflicts have arisen under both scenarios as 
incentives for all stakeholder groups have never been aligned completely.   
In recent decades, there has been growing awareness and investor attention to the 
impact a firm’s existence and operations have on society – its social consequences. This 
gave rise to a need for the evaluation of the social responsibility of the company - the idea 
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Geethamani (2017)1 defines CSR as “movement 
aimed at encouraging companies to be more aware of the impact of their business on the 
rest of society, including their stakeholders and the environment.” CSR is a broad concept 
that is associated with the sustainability of the company which includes human rights, 
corporate governance, environmental effects. 
                                                 
1 Geethamani, S “Advantages and disadvantages of corporate social responsibility.” International 
Journal of Applied Research (2017); 372-374. 
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The Environmental, Social and Governance (referred to as ESG hereafter) 
dimension of CSR performance is the focus of this paper. Market Business News2 defines 
the criteria of each components specifically. Environmental criteria are about how the 
company acts to protect the environment, and social criteria look at the relationship 
between the company and the other stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, 
customers, and communities where the company operates. The governance part is 
determined by the company’s leadership, executive pay, audit, internal controls, and 
shareholder’s rights. 
 
2. The Role of the Ownership 
Different types of ownership may play a significant role in a firm’s appetite for 
embracing ESG. This is because the board of directors determines most of the decisions 
for the company, and the board members are elected by the voters of the company, who 
are called shareholders. Moreover, since the shareholders are the representatives from their 
respective groups, they tend to encourage the activities of the company to meet their 
group’s special interest. According to Diantimala and Amril (2018), the decision by the 
company could be changed to meet the dominant ownership party’s interests. For example, 
the company dominated by the insiders shows the tendency to avoid the decision in 
investment in environmental practices. Short-term strategies that maximize the profit is 
attentional to the top managers, because they assume that the environmental protection 
                                                 
2 Nordqvist, Christian. “What Is ESG? Definition and Meaning.” Market Business News, Market 
Business News, 20 Aug. 2018, marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/esg-
definition-meaning/. 
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practices and related activities will increase their facility cost, which decreases their 
compensation based on the earnings. 
On the other hand, when the institutional owners take control of the firm, the 
decision from the company is determined by the level of pressure from the institutions. In 
case the institution has less interest in environmental protection, the company would not 
likely increase their investment in environmental protection practices. However, decisions 
led by institutional owners usually meet the shareholder’s best interests because of their 
duty to keep the effective monitoring roles (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Considering the 
minority shareholders, the institutional owners also have information advantages and are 
able to exercise significant voting power (Schnatterly et al. 2008). In addition, institutional 
owners with enormous shareholdings may not sell their portion at lower prices; they can 
participate in the firm’s strategic decisions (Oh at el. 2017). 
 
Literature Review 
1. ESG Disclosure and the Firm Value 
Recent studies have revealed the relationship between the level of disclosure and 
the firm value. Since the ESG improves transparency and accountability and enhances 
stakeholder trust, the value of the firm increases naturally in the company which discloses 
ESG. In this case, enlarging the extent of CEO authority enhances the ESG disclosure 
effects, helping the CEO to easily commit the ESG practice (Li et al. 2018). 
Also, changes in dividends payouts affect the value of the firm directly by 
impacting on their reputation and share prices. According to the study held in India (Seth 
and Mathenthiran, 2016), since ESG disclosure influences to the dividend payouts, high 
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level of ESG disclosure increases the value of the firm, and it could be a positive signal to 
the institutional investors too. Each of the components of ESG, environmental, social 
responsibility, and governance are related to the firm value, repetitively. Fatemi et al. (2017) 
found “Environmental strengths increase the firm’s valuation and that weaknesses decrease 
it; in both cases, disclosure wields a moderating influence” and “while weaknesses in both 
areas again tend to decrease valuation, neither social nor governance strengths increase.” 
Moreover, among the ESG components, governance dimension contributes most in 
increasing the firm value by becoming the “key driver affecting the Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) relationship” (Paniagua 
et al. 2018). In addition, Voluntary environmental disclosure quality is also positively 
related to the firm value, influencing both of the expected future cash flows and the cost of 
equity (Plumlee et al. 2015). 
 
2. ESG Disclosure Affecting Factors 
ESG Rating is positively related to the value of the firm. Tamimi and Sebastianelli 
(2017) mentioned the factors that affect the ESG disclosure scores. ESG disclosure scores 
could be varied because of certain factors which are the industry that the company belongs 
in, large-market capitalizations (>$10 billion) rather than mid-cap firms, and the 
governance dimension of ESG. Moreover, Garcia et al. (2017) found the tendency in Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa markets (so-called BRICS, and emerging markets) 
that the firms listed in the sensitive industries, which are systematic social taboos, moral 
debates, and political pressures and those that are more likely to cause social and 
environmental damage such as major socio-environmental impact: energy, including oil 
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and gas; chemicals; paper and pulp; mining; and steel making (Lee and Faff, 2009), have 
better ESG performance. Reasoning that since these firms are likely to cause harm to 
society, they tend to protect their reputation by disclosing their ESG performance. In 
addition, ESG performance is under the influence of cross-listing. Bosco and Misani (2016) 
shed light on the cross-listing firms and ESG performance. They found that cross-listing 
leads to better ESG performance, but the effect is limited in environmental and social 
performance dimension only, excluding corporate governance dimension, because “cross-
listed firms adopt ESG practices to mitigate the liability of foreignness in foreign financial 
markets.”  
 
Hypotheses 
One of the big curiosities for the study is to reveal the factors that affect the firm’s 
financial performance, assuming the affecting elements as one of the references in 
decision-making for the investments. And the recent studies show that ESG score has a 
potential to increase the firm value (Fatemi, at el. 2015). When the available resource in 
the firm is limited, and if the firm decided to proceed the environmentally or social 
investments, these types of activities bring positive effect on their reputation and intensify 
the interaction with its stakeholders (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). Therefore, we can 
anticipate that the potential to attract competing employees would be increased then, the 
financial performance of the firm will naturally follow the stream as the ESG rating is 
increased. We can investigate the relationship setting Return on Asset as criteria of the 
financial performance. 
Hypothesis 1: 
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Null: ESG Score and Its Components Does Not Affect ROA 
Alt: ESG Score and Its Components Does Affect ROA 
 
The study starts with the idea that the performance of the corporation is attributed 
based on the ownership structure. The ownership structure could affect financial 
performance. The changes in ownership structure affect the financial performance of the 
firm. For example, as the number of the board members increase, ROE is likely to decrease, 
because a growing number of board members induce increasing ownership cost as 
dividend payouts (Paniagua et al. 2018). What if we were found the link between 
ownership structure and the ESG ratings, we can prove that the ownership structure affects 
the firm’s financial performance, by influencing the ESG ratings. Enlargement in family 
ownership and closely held ownership, which are the most common ownership structures 
(La Porta et al., 1999), even though it is difficult to define the direction of causality, it 
discourages ESG investment so that it decreases the ESG scores (Rees and Rodionova, 
2015). 
Moreover, Corporate Social Responsibility score also influenced by the ownership 
structure (Crisóstomo and Freire, 2015). In case of the firm with concentrated ownership, 
they are likely to invest their free cash flow into CSR, because majority of the shareholder 
acknowledged the fact that CSR is one of the effective ways to improve image and 
reputation of the firm. Likewise, the firm with majority of the institutional ownership is 
likely to decide to increase the amount of the investment in CSR. In this case, stronger 
governance triggers the synergistic effects, which are the non-linear effects of the insider 
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and institutional ownership, by promoting CSR (Oh et al. 2017). Therefore, in this study, 
we are going to find the link from insider or institutional ownership to the ESG score. 
Hypothesis 2 & 3 
Null: Inside Ownership Does Not Affect ESG Score of a Firm 
Alt: Inside Ownership Does Affect ESG Score of a Firm 
Null: Institutional ownership does not affect the ESG Score of a firm 
Alt:  Institutional ownership affects the ESG Score of a firm 
 
Data and Methodology 
1. Data Description 
This study used ESG, Environmental, Social and Governance scores and insider 
and ownership data with market capitalization and Return on Asset. The base sample was 
2,563 companies from the U.S. across 10 sectors for one year period 2017 and subtracted 
to 398 excludes sample with numerical errors and mismatch to the variables. These data 
obtained from Bloomberg. The dependent variable are ROA, ESG, environmental, social 
and governance score. The variables of interest were measured as follows: the insider 
ownership variable was measured by the percentage of outstanding shares held by insiders. 
Institutional ownership variable was measured by the percentage of shares outstanding held 
by institutions which are mutual funds and institutional stakeholdings. Return On Asset 
variable is measured by net income divided by the total asset. Market capitalization 
variable was obtained from Compustat in WRDS and displayed in billions. 
Table1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables          Obs          Mean    Std. Dev.      Min   Max 
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ESG Score 398 55.12748 8.041018 28.01259 72.19762 
Environmental Score 398 59.95482 9.321581 41.38521 80.93318 
Social Score 398 57.39416 6.883527 36.47267 75.70834 
Governance Score 398 52.96767 11.388620 16.71782 73.77524 
Insider Ownership 398 0.02342 0.057968 0.00020 0.54980 
Institutional Ownership 398 0.81953 0.161979 0.03120 0.99630 
Market Capitalization 398 45.82385 84.183770 0.00600 729.43900 
ROA 398 0.07020 0.056655 -0.06300 0.23660 
 
 
Table2 
Sector Frequency Chart                                                                                                
Sector Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Communications 20 5.03% 5.03% 
Consumer Discretionary 40 10.05% 15.08% 
Consumer Staples 46 11.56% 26.63% 
Energy 34 8.54% 35.18% 
Financials 32 8.04% 43.22% 
Health care 46 11.56% 54.77% 
Industrials 64 16.08% 70.85% 
Materials 30 7.54% 78.39% 
Technology 44 11.06% 89.45% 
Utilities 42 10.55% 100.00% 
total 398 100.00%  
   
2. Methodology 
This study performed two types of regreesion analysis to reject the null hypotheses. 
For null hyphothesis 1, we used basic linear regression, however, for hypothesis 2 & 3, 
cross-sectional regression analysis is performed. To see the interactive effects of insider 
and ownership structure, an interaction term is also included in this regression model.  
 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟)
12
𝑘=3 + 𝜀𝑖 
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 𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟)
12
𝑘=3 + 𝜀𝑖  
 
 
  Table 3 
Summary Statistics: Correlation    
 
ESG ES SS GS Insider Institution MC ROA 
ESG 1.0000 
       
ES 0.4950 1.0000 
      
SS 0.5234 0.6211 1.0000 
     
GS 0.8679 0.1265 0.1864 1.0000 
    
Insider -0.0965 -0.2374 -0.0571 -0.0260 1.0000 
   
Institution 0.0462 0.0578 0.0985 -0.0020 -0.3224 1.0000 
  
MC -0.1113 0.2877 0.0499 -0.2157 -0.0552 -0.0272 1.0000 
 
ROA 0.1441 -0.0095 0.1114 0.1370 -0.0095 0.1191 0.0748 1.0000 
Notes: ESG score is Environmental, Social and Governance score data from Bloomberg. 
ES=Environmental Score, SS=Social Score, GS=Governmental Score, Insider=Insider Ownership, 
Institution=Institutional Ownership, MC=Market Capitalization, ROA = Return on Asset. 
 
Empirical Results and Analysis 
Hypothesis 1: 
Null: ESG Score and Its Components Does Not Affect ROA 
Alt: ESG Score and Its Components Does Affect ROA 
 
 
First, to reject null hypothesis 1, we performed regression analysis using Return on 
Asset as dependent variable, and ESG score, Environmental Score, Social Score, and 
Governance Score are independent variable respectively. To test the effect of ESG score 
which is, it brings strong reputation to the firm and intensify the positive relationship with 
the stockholders (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006), we assumed that the changes in ESG and 
its components score would affect to ROA which represents one firm’s profitability in this 
paper. 
Table4  
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Regression Result of ESG and Profitability 
 Dependent variable: 
 Return on Asset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ESG 0.001***    
 (0.0004)    
Environ  -0.0001   
  (0.0003)   
Social   0.001**  
   (0.0004)  
Govern    0.001*** 
    (0.0002) 
Constant 0.014 0.074*** 0.018 0.034** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.013) 
Observations 398 398 398 398 
R2 0.021 0.0001 0.012 0.019 
Adjusted R2 0.018 -0.002 0.010 0.016 
Residual Std. Error 
(df = 396) 
0.056 0.057 0.056 0.056 
F Statistic (df = 1; 
396) 
8.408*** 0.036 4.983** 7.576*** 
Note: Dependent variable is Return on Asset, and independent variables are ESG, Environmental 
Score, Social Score, Governance Score. ROA represents the profitability of the firm. t-statistics in 
parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 4 shows the result of regression analysis with ESG over Return on Asset. As 
a result, we find that ESG positively significant effects on ROA in 99% of confidence level. 
The result can reject the null hyphothesis 1. The result could be verifed using accounting 
explanation. ROA is the profitability of the asset that is being used. The reason that we did 
not use the Return on Equity instead of ROA is that since ROE is influenced by financial 
leverage, it could be viased and it is less likely to show the pure profitability of the firm, 
so we preformed the research using ROA only.  The result in table4 is in line with Margolis 
et al. (2009) and Fatemi et al. (2015),  finds that the overall ESG effect to the financial 
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performance is positive and ESG score has a potential to increase the firm value. The result 
shows the ESG’s repuational effect (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006), allocating the free cash 
flow to the ESG factors strengthens the profitability by affecting positively to the reputation 
of the firm, and it brings competing employees who are capable of improving the firm’s 
operating activities to increase their revenue. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Null: Inside Ownership Does Not Affect ESG Score of a Firm 
Alt: Inside Ownership Does Affect ESG Score of a Firm 
 
Second, we set the analysis to see how the insider ownership affects ESG and its 
components. At this regression model we applied market capitalization as control variable, 
transforming to logarithmic to control the percent change effect and applied interaction 
term to industry classification based on Communication industry. It will illustrate how the 
insider ownership affects to the ESG and its components varying the industry.  
 
Table5 
Cross-Sectional Regression Result about Insider Ownership and ESG Score 
 Dependent variable: 
 ESG Environ Social Govern ESG Environ Social Govern 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Insider -12.988* -32.300*** -5.370 -7.194 -116.841 -387.064*** -185.293* 5.050 
 (6.982) (7.376) (5.958) (9.885) (127.681) (134.284) (106.696) (184.589) 
logmarketcap 2.704 39.396*** 9.498** -13.951** 5.189 38.786*** 3.353 -7.185 
 (4.878) (5.153) (4.163) (6.906) (5.253) (5.525) (4.390) (7.595) 
Insider:Consumer.Discretionary     119.823 347.774** 183.088* 17.104 
     (130.446) (137.193) (109.007) (188.587) 
Insider:Consumer.Staples     134.467 369.920*** 205.060* 28.640 
     (129.729) (136.439) (108.408) (187.551) 
Insider:Energy     131.943 368.507*** 235.757** 5.496 
     (130.927) (137.699) (109.409) (189.282) 
Insider:Financials     116.819 368.269*** 188.789* -1.923 
     (127.999) (134.619) (106.962) (185.049) 
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Insider:Health.Care     119.495 340.480** 162.759 21.252 
     (129.456) (136.152) (108.180) (187.156) 
Insider:Industrials     17.811 308.055** 101.721 -51.661 
     (132.121) (138.955) (110.407) (191.009) 
Insider:Materials     15.527 308.502** 143.087 -128.236 
     (131.443) (138.242) (109.841) (190.029) 
Insider:Technology     115.631 380.867*** 180.992* -10.739 
     (129.062) (135.738) (107.851) (186.586) 
Insider:Utilities     -57.103 -207.607 -64.621 185.045 
     (631.853) (664.533) (528.007) (913.475) 
Constant 53.449*** 31.822*** 50.555*** 63.366*** 47.098*** 31.306*** 54.353*** 51.905*** 
 (3.620) (3.824) (3.090) (5.125) (4.886) (5.138) (4.083) (7.063) 
Observations 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 
R2 0.010 0.178 0.016 0.011 0.164 0.312 0.203 0.129 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.174 0.011 0.006 0.119 0.275 0.161 0.082 
Residual Std. Error 
8.021  
(df = 395) 
8.473  
(df = 
395) 
6.845  
(df = 
395) 
11.355  
(df = 
395) 
7.546  
(df = 377) 
7.936  
(df = 377) 
6.306  
(df = 
377) 
10.909  
(df = 
377) 
F Statistic 
2.013 
(df = 2; 395) 
42.761*** 
(df = 2; 
395) 
3.258** 
(df = 2; 
395) 
2.176  
(df = 2; 
395) 
3.689***  
(df = 20; 
377) 
8.534***  
(df = 20; 
377) 
4.803***  
(df = 20; 
377) 
2.782***  
(df = 20; 
377) 
Note: This table presents the result of cross-sectional regression analysis between Insider Ownership and 
ESG and its components using the data from Bloomberg during 2017, where the dependent variables are 
ESG Rating, Environmental Score, Social Score, and Governance Score. Interaction term is applied in 
this regression. Whole table is provided in appendix A. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
  
 
 
Table 5 shows the result of the regression analysis between insider ownership and the ESG 
and its components. The result can reject the null hypothesis 2. Insider ownership affects 
the ESG score significantly negatively at confidence level of 90%. When the insider 
ownership changed by 1% it decreases ESG score by 0.129 point. However, there was an 
interesting founding about insider ownership and Environmental Score relationship. The 
result shows the negatively significant relationship, showing that 1% increasing in insider 
ownership would bring 0.323 point decreasing in Environmental Score at 99% of 
confidential level. We find negative relationship between insider ownership and ESG and 
its components. The finding of negative relationship between insider ownership and 
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Environmental Score is in line with Diantimala and Amril (2018). Using interaction term, 
we find the differences in changing the percent of insider ownership in industries. In ESG, 
Environmental and Social Score, most of the industries show positive relationship to the 
insider ownership based on communication industry. However, we find that Utility 
industry only shows adverse relationship to ESG, Environmental and Social Score. We 
also find that relationship between insider ownership and ESG and its components could 
be changed by firm size. We noticed that as the size of the firm is growing, even though it 
does not have statistical significance in ESG Score alone, but it positively related to 
Environmental and Social Score at 99% and 90% of confidential level, and negatively 
related to Governance Score at 90% level. Even Environmental Score is increased by 0.393 
point per percent changes in market capitalization. The result is in line with Suttipun and 
Stanton (2012); Lu and Abeysekara (2014); the bigger companies have more incentives to 
disclosure more environmental information. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Null: Institutional ownership does not affect the ESG Score of a firm 
Alt:  Institutional ownership affects the ESG Score of a firm 
 
Last, we set the analysis to see how the institutional ownership affects ESG and its 
components. At this regression model we set the market capitalization as control variable, 
transforming to logarithmic to control the percent change effect and applied interaction 
term to industry classification based on Communication industry. It will illustrate how the 
institutional ownership affects the ESG and its components varying the industry.  
 
Table6 
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Cross-Sectional Regression Result about Institutional Ownership and ESG Score 
 Dependent variable: 
 ESG Environ Social Govern ESG Environ Social Govern 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Institution 2.222 2.447 3.986* 0.145 -9.952* -13.313** -13.641*** -9.927 
 (2.496) (2.688) (2.115) (3.524) (5.794) (6.191) (4.839) (8.362) 
logmarketcap 3.469 41.549*** 9.568** -13.439* 11.529** 44.431*** 8.584* -1.947 
 (4.872) (5.247) (4.130) (6.879) (5.460) (5.834) (4.560) (7.880) 
Institution:Consumer.Discretionary     30.357*** 9.276 26.043*** 34.378** 
     (11.129) (11.890) (9.294) (16.060) 
Institution:Consumer.Staples     3.257 8.793 21.139** 19.542 
     (11.908) (12.722) (9.945) (17.184) 
Institution:Energy     7.014 10.618 8.436 2.770 
     (9.145) (9.770) (7.638) (13.197) 
Institution:Financials     7.992 14.178* 12.408** 8.061 
     (7.471) (7.982) (6.239) (10.781) 
Institution:Health.Care     19.731 -2.555 13.127 22.823 
     (15.813) (16.894) (13.206) (22.819) 
Institution:Industrials     29.141** 23.909* 21.450** 26.623 
     (12.924) (13.809) (10.794) (18.651) 
Institution:Materials     13.453 21.614* 16.368* 10.378 
     (10.447) (11.162) (8.725) (15.076) 
Institution:Technology     12.663 12.769 24.282** 11.330 
     (12.457) (13.309) (10.403) (17.976) 
Institution:Utilities     33.574** 40.515*** 32.769*** 28.127 
     (13.092) (13.987) (10.934) (18.893) 
Constant 50.763*** 27.482*** 47.112*** 62.704*** 47.995*** 32.787*** 58.187*** 54.758*** 
 (4.063) (4.376) (3.444) (5.737) (6.146) (6.566) (5.133) (8.869) 
Observations 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 
R2 0.003 0.140 0.023 0.010 0.157 0.284 0.197 0.124 
Adjusted R2 -0.002 0.136 0.018 0.005 0.112 0.246 0.155 0.078 
Residual Std. Error 
8.048  
(df = 395) 
8.667  
(df = 395) 
6.821  
(df = 395) 
11.363  
(df = 395) 
7.578  
(df = 377) 
8.097  
(df = 377) 
6.329  
(df = 377) 
10.936  
(df = 377) 
F Statistic 
0.677 
(df = 2; 
395) 
32.117***  
(df = 2; 
395) 
4.647**  
(df = 2; 
395) 
1.909  
(df = 2; 
395) 
3.499***  
(df = 20; 
377) 
7.461***  
(df = 20; 
377) 
4.630***  
(df = 20; 
377) 
2.676***  
(df = 20; 
377) 
Note: This table presents the result of cross-sectional regression analysis between Institutional Ownership 
and ESG and its components using the data from Bloomberg during 2017, where the dependent variables 
are ESG Rating, Environmental Score, Social Score, and Governance Score. Interaction term is applied 
in this regression. Whole table is provided in appendix B. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
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Table 6 shows the result of the regression analysis between institutional ownership and the 
ESG and its components. The result can not reject the null hypothesis 3. The institutional 
ownership shows positive relationship to Social Score only at confidence level of 90%. 
When the institutional ownership changed by 1% it increases ESG score by 0.022 point. 
However, there was an interesting founding about institutional ownership and ESG and its 
components. Unlike to the insider ownership effect, we find that the institutional ownership 
positively related to the ESG and its components. 
The finding of negative relationship between insider ownership and Environmental 
Score is in line with Diantimala and Amril (2018). Using interaction term, we find the 
differences in changing the percent of insider ownership in industries. In ESG,  
Environmental and Social Score, most of the industries show positive relationship to the 
insider ownership based on communication industry. However, we find that Utility 
industry only shows adverse relationship to ESG, Environmental and Social Score. This 
result is in line with the Chang and Le (2015) as a fact that institutional ownership 
positively related to environmental disclosure in polluting industries, however, in this paper 
the result shows that the institutional ownership positively related to not only the polluting 
industries but also other industries except Healthcare industry. In most of the industries, 
the institutional ownership brings positive effect to ESG and its components. We also find 
that relationship between institutional ownership and ESG and its components could be 
changed by firm size. We noticed that as the size of the firm is growing, even though it 
does not have statistical significance in ESG Score alone, but it increases the ESG, 
Environmental and Social Score. Even Environmental Score is increased by 0.416 point 
per percent changes in market capitalization. The result from table 6 also supports the study 
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from Suttipun and Stanton (2012); Lu and Abeysekara (2014); the bigger companies have 
more incentives to disclosure more environmental information. Additionally, the result that 
the institutional ownership does not show the significance toward ESG score could be 
explained by the study held by Kim et al. (2018) that if the institutional ownership was not 
active for a long period of the time, even though it takes significant portion of the 
ownership, it would not show any significant effect to ESG Score.   
 
Conclusion 
           In addition to testing for a link between ownership structure and ESG score, 
this paper relies on previously unexplained data on ESG score and its components and tests 
of their direct link to ownership structure and indirect link to the profitability of the firm. 
Using a sample of 398 firms in the U.S. in 2017, we contributed to research that focuses 
on the profitability of the firm. First, we introduce the relationship between ESG rating and 
its components to the firm’s profitability, using Return on Asset as matrix of profitability, 
and shows ESG, Social and Governance Score exert a significant positive effect on the 
profitability of the firm. Then, we performed a cross-sectional analysis with interaction 
term to see how the insider and institutional ownership structure affect the firm’s ESG 
score. Using market capitalization as a control variable and using interaction term to 
industry classification, we find that insider ownership significantly negative relation to 
ESG and Environmental Score, it could be explained by the situation that as the managers 
take more ownership, they tend to exert their influence on the firm’s decision by denying 
the ESG investment to maximize their short-term profit. Since the firm avoid to invest in 
environmental practices that increases cost of their plant as a depreciation cost, the 
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decreasing in Environmental Score is observed by increasing the insider ownership. And 
unlike to the other industries, Utility industry only shows adverse relation to ESG, 
Environmental and Social score based on Communication sector by changes in insider 
ownership. The institutional ownership significantly affects the Social scores only; 
however, it was not seen statistically significant, but the institutional ownership positively 
related to ESG and its components all. Both of the insider and institutional ownership 
shows the size effect which is that as the size of the firm is growing they tend to disclose 
more in environmental score.  
The user could use this study to confirm the basic interrelation between ownership 
structure and profitability of the firm. The ownership structure influences the firm’s 
profitability by affecting the decisions in board members, and the following decision 
inevitably leads ESG performance to the direction in which the types of ownership pursues. 
As the growing portion of the insider ownership weakens the ESG and its components 
Scores and the institutional ownership strengthens those scores. Based on our findings, we 
offer the debatable argument that the firm needs to consider finding a way to get invest 
from institutions. Because growing portion of the institutions and the institution 
participates as an active the manager as well, it would strengthen the ESG and its 
components, then as we mentioned in the paper, Strong ESG Score strengthens the firm’s 
profitability which brings positive effect of the firm’s valuation. However, the study is 
performed by limited time period data and only includes U.S firm data, there still remain 
possibilities for the following researcher to make up extend time period and enlarge the 
sample country about this topic.  
 
Appendix A 
Cross-Sectional Regression Result about Insider Ownership and ESG Score 
 Dependent variable: 
 ESG Environ Social Govern ESG Environ Social Govern 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Insider -12.988* -32.300*** -5.370 -7.194 -116.841 -387.064*** -185.293* 5.050 
 (6.982) (7.376) (5.958) (9.885) (127.681) (134.284) (106.696) (184.589) 
logmarketcap 2.704 39.396*** 9.498** -13.951** 5.189 38.786*** 3.353 -7.185 
 (4.878) (5.153) (4.163) (6.906) (5.253) (5.525) (4.390) (7.595) 
Consumer.Discretionary     3.384 -0.620 0.418 5.831 
     (2.559) (2.691) (2.139) (3.700) 
Consumer.Staples     3.418 -1.735 0.739 4.355 
     (2.401) (2.525) (2.007) (3.471) 
Energy     7.452*** 0.308 -2.935 13.598*** 
     (2.519) (2.649) (2.105) (3.642) 
Financials     -1.231 -4.983* -5.198** 1.606 
     (2.669) (2.807) (2.231) (3.859) 
Health.Care     1.575 -0.394 1.465 2.080 
     (2.403) (2.527) (2.008) (3.473) 
Industrials     8.126*** 4.701* 3.953** 9.028*** 
     (2.383) (2.506) (1.991) (3.445) 
Materials     10.137*** 6.500** 3.071 12.556*** 
     (2.710) (2.850) (2.264) (3.917) 
Technology     4.558* 4.416* 5.265*** 4.304 
     (2.410) (2.535) (2.014) (3.484) 
Utilities     6.154** 2.710 -1.148 8.400* 
     (2.993) (3.148) (2.501) (4.327) 
Insider:Consumer.Discretionary     119.823 347.774** 183.088* 17.104 
     (130.446) (137.193) (109.007) (188.587) 
Insider:Consumer.Staples     134.467 369.920*** 205.060* 28.640 
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     (129.729) (136.439) (108.408) (187.551) 
Insider:Energy     131.943 368.507*** 235.757** 5.496 
     (130.927) (137.699) (109.409) (189.282) 
Insider:Financials     116.819 368.269*** 188.789* -1.923 
     (127.999) (134.619) (106.962) (185.049) 
Insider:Health.Care     119.495 340.480** 162.759 21.252 
     (129.456) (136.152) (108.180) (187.156) 
Insider:Industrials     17.811 308.055** 101.721 -51.661 
     (132.121) (138.955) (110.407) (191.009) 
Insider:Materials     15.527 308.502** 143.087 -128.236 
     (131.443) (138.242) (109.841) (190.029) 
Insider:Technology     115.631 380.867*** 180.992* -10.739 
     (129.062) (135.738) (107.851) (186.586) 
Insider:Utilities     -57.103 -207.607 -64.621 185.045 
     (631.853) (664.533) (528.007) (913.475) 
Constant 53.449*** 31.822*** 50.555*** 63.366*** 47.098*** 31.306*** 54.353*** 51.905*** 
 (3.620) (3.824) (3.090) (5.125) (4.886) (5.138) (4.083) (7.063) 
Observations 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 
R2 0.010 0.178 0.016 0.011 0.164 0.312 0.203 0.129 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.174 0.011 0.006 0.119 0.275 0.161 0.082 
Residual Std. Error 
8.021  
(df = 395) 
8.473  
(df = 395) 
6.845  
(df = 395) 
11.355  
(df = 395) 
7.546  
(df = 377) 
7.936  
(df = 377) 
6.306  
(df = 377) 
10.909  
(df = 377) 
F Statistic 
2.013 
(df = 2; 395) 
42.761*** 
(df = 2; 395) 
3.258** 
(df = 2; 395) 
2.176  
(df = 2; 395) 
3.689***  
(df = 20; 377) 
8.534***  
(df = 20; 377) 
4.803***  
(df = 20; 377) 
2.782***  
(df = 20; 377) 
Note: This table presents the result of cross-sectional regression analysis between Insider Ownership and ESG and its components using the data 
from Bloomberg during 2017, where the dependent variables are ESG Rating, Environmental Score, Social Score, and Governance Score. 
Interaction term is applied in this regression. t-statistics are parenthesis.  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix B 
Cross-Sectional Regression Result about Institutional Ownership and ESG Score 
 Dependent variable: 
 ESG Environ Social Govern ESG Environ Social Govern 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Institution 2.222 2.447 3.986* 0.145 -9.952* -13.313** -13.641*** -9.927 
 (2.496) (2.688) (2.115) (3.524) (5.794) (6.191) (4.839) (8.362) 
logmarketcap 3.469 41.549*** 9.568** -13.439* 11.529** 44.431*** 8.584* -1.947 
 (4.872) (5.247) (4.130) (6.879) (5.460) (5.834) (4.560) (7.880) 
Consumer.Discretionary     -19.090** -3.969 -17.645** -20.622 
     (9.181) (9.809) (7.668) (13.250) 
Consumer.Staples     3.653 -4.057 -12.889 -9.784 
     (9.785) (10.454) (8.172) (14.120) 
Energy     4.173 -3.847 -6.062 12.055 
     (6.818) (7.284) (5.694) (9.839) 
Financials     -4.968 -12.194* -11.410** -3.197 
     (5.908) (6.312) (4.934) (8.526) 
Health.Care     -12.782 6.667 -6.494 -15.561 
     (13.758) (14.699) (11.490) (19.855) 
Industrials     -15.354 -11.146 -11.610 -12.687 
     (10.901) (11.647) (9.104) (15.731) 
Materials     -0.432 -7.547 -7.578 2.723 
     (8.514) (9.096) (7.110) (12.286) 
Technology     -3.577 -1.127 -11.808 -3.946 
     (10.442) (11.157) (8.721) (15.069) 
Utilities     -19.400* -27.120** -25.327*** -12.778 
     (10.825) (11.566) (9.041) (15.622) 
Institution:Consumer.Discretionary     30.357*** 9.276 26.043*** 34.378** 
     (11.129) (11.890) (9.294) (16.060) 
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Institution:Consumer.Staples     3.257 8.793 21.139** 19.542 
     (11.908) (12.722) (9.945) (17.184) 
Institution:Energy     7.014 10.618 8.436 2.770 
     (9.145) (9.770) (7.638) (13.197) 
Institution:Financials     7.992 14.178* 12.408** 8.061 
     (7.471) (7.982) (6.239) (10.781) 
Institution:Health.Care     19.731 -2.555 13.127 22.823 
     (15.813) (16.894) (13.206) (22.819) 
Institution:Industrials     29.141** 23.909* 21.450** 26.623 
     (12.924) (13.809) (10.794) (18.651) 
Institution:Materials     13.453 21.614* 16.368* 10.378 
     (10.447) (11.162) (8.725) (15.076) 
Institution:Technology     12.663 12.769 24.282** 11.330 
     (12.457) (13.309) (10.403) (17.976) 
Institution:Utilities     33.574** 40.515*** 32.769*** 28.127 
     (13.092) (13.987) (10.934) (18.893) 
Constant 50.763*** 27.482*** 47.112*** 62.704*** 47.995*** 32.787*** 58.187*** 54.758*** 
 (4.063) (4.376) (3.444) (5.737) (6.146) (6.566) (5.133) (8.869) 
Observations 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 
R2 0.003 0.140 0.023 0.010 0.157 0.284 0.197 0.124 
Adjusted R2 -0.002 0.136 0.018 0.005 0.112 0.246 0.155 0.078 
Residual Std. Error 
8.048  
(df = 395) 
8.667  
(df = 395) 
6.821  
(df = 395) 
11.363  
(df = 395) 
7.578  
(df = 377) 
8.097  
(df = 377) 
6.329  
(df = 377) 
10.936  
(df = 377) 
F Statistic 
0.677 
(df = 2; 395) 
32.117***  
(df = 2; 395) 
4.647**  
(df = 2; 395) 
1.909  
(df = 2; 395) 
3.499***  
(df = 20; 377) 
7.461***  
(df = 20; 377) 
4.630***  
(df = 20; 377) 
2.676***  
(df = 20; 377) 
Note: This table presents the result of cross-sectional regression analysis between Institutional Ownership and ESG and its components using the 
data from Bloomberg during 2017, where the dependent variables are ESG Rating, Environmental Score, Social Score, and Governance Score. 
Interaction term is applied in this regression. t-statistics are parenthesis.  *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
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